Abstract: While philosophy has conceded much ground to the sciences when it comes to investigating the natural world, many have held onto the mind-body problem as still presenting a distinctively philosophical problem. In particular, mind-body relations remain a subject for armchair speculations. The two most prominent arguments on the mind-body problem from the last two decades -Chalmers' zombie argument and Kim's exclusion argument -are primarily driven by a priori premises. I advocate specific objections to the a priori premises of each argument. More generally, I urge that such a priori approaches overreach the territory for which philosophy is properly suited. I conclude by suggesting a more modest role for a priori (e.g., metaphysical) reasoning.
1.
Philosophy has long claimed the mind-body problem, which presses us to discover and explain the relationship between the mind and body, as its own. This made sense millennia ago, when natural phenomena of various kinds were included as belonging within the domain of philosophy. But as many of these topics, such as the nature and origin of animal life and the heavens, were taken over by the natural sciences, we might wonder why the mind-body problem persists as a particularly philosophical problem.
Philosophers did not discover that water is H2O (no, not even Saul Kripke), so why should we think that philosophers, in their capacity as a priori theorizers, can discover and explain the relationship between mind and body?
The phrase "the mind-body problem" is ambiguous, and it is likely a misnomer. There isn't the problem of mind-body relations, there are many. My focus here will be on the ontological problems: What is mental stuff, and how does it relate to physical stuff? What kinds of mental states are there, and how do they relate to physical kinds? The first question is answered by positions like substance dualism and physicalism. It is the more fundamental ontological question. But given the wide acceptance of physicalism as an empirical thesis, most contemporary discussion has focused on the kind-question. And kind distinctness -non-reductive physicalism -is still the dominant position among philosophers. I will examine the appropriateness of philosophical methods for answering this question, criticizing what I see as an over-extension of a priori tools.
The main thesis I wish to defend is that the relationship between psychological and physical kinds cannot be known on a priori, or largely a priori, grounds. Unfortunately, I see our recent philosophical history as violating this maxim. Consider the two most influential arguments concerning the mind-body problem from the last couple decadesDavid Chalmers' zombie argument and Jaegwon Kim's exclusion argument. The former is an exclusively a priori argument that concludes that the varieties of phenomenal consciousness are kind-distinct from the physical. In fact, phenomenal consciousness is not even metaphysically necessitated by the physical. The latter argument is not exclusively a priori -it contains empirical premises, for example about the causal completeness of physics -but its critical premise that rules out systematic overdetermination is a priori. And at least some versions of this argument conclude that psychological kinds must be identical to physical kinds (or else they are epiphenomenal).
It would be very unusual if the nature of contingently instantiated kinds that seem suited for scientific study -psychology -could be known a priori. We no longer think that the elements or heavenly bodies can be known by armchair speculation. So why the continued a priori treatment of psychological kinds? I think we should take seriously the tinge of embarrassment that, I hope, we would experience upon attempting to explain to our scientific colleagues that we have discovered, say, that phenomenal kinds are not physical kinds because, consistent with the physical facts, zombies are ideally conceivable.
The alternative conception that I favor endorses a division of labor between a priori methods that are the bread and butter of traditional philosophy, but also sees contributions acquired through empirical methods as essential -and vice versa. A distinctive contribution from each method is required. Chalmers has made this point to some extent, claiming that empirical results alone cannot settle many of the long-standing issues in the philosophy of mind.
"Whenever empirical results are brought to bear on the philosophical questions, the application requires some sort of philosophical premise to serve as a bridge. And in case of the big philosophical questions above, in order for this premise to be strong enough that the data bears directly on the question, the premise is typically so strong that it is almost as contentious as the philosophical views at issue… I take the moral to be that the debates in question may well have a deeply philosophical core, one that is unlikely to be resolved by the straightforward application of empirical results. Instead, the core of the debates may well rest on conceptual, metaphysical, and normative issues that fall largely within the a priori domain. So philosophers should not feel embarrassed at spending a lot of time working in a largely non-empirical mode, as most philosophers do." 1 This is true to a large extent. But I caution against going too far in the other direction.
Empirical data alone typically does not settle kind-questions, but neither does a priori speculation alone. In the next 2 sections I offer "big picture", yet I also think effective, criticisms of the two major a priori based arguments from the last couple decades -the zombie argument and the exclusion argument.
2.
Philosophy has a long history of a priori speculations about the nature of psychological kinds (and mentality more generally). In retrospect, we should see that many of these speculations were misguided. Yet to this day we see philosophers making very similar speculations, stretching the limits of a priori reasoning and the significance of our inability to imagine certain possibilities. Take, for example, Chalmers' zombie argument.
In this argument let 'P' stand for the physical truths and 'Q' stand for the truths about phenomenal consciousness:
1. P&~Q is conceivable.
2. If P&~Q is conceivable, then P&~Q is 1-possible.
3. If P&~Q is 1-possible, then P&~Q is 2-possible or Russellian monism is true.
4. If P&~Q is 2-possible, materialism is false.
Materialism is false or Russellian monism is true. 2
The gist of the argument is as follows. If we had all the physical facts before us and we were ideally rational, then we could conceive of the physical facts obtaining but not phenomenal consciousness (or, at least, we could not rule this out). If this is conceivable, then it is possible in the same sense, 1-possibility, that it is possible that water is not H2O.
Namely, if we were to consider the imagined world as actual, 'water is not H2O' is true.
But because there is no appearance/reality distinction for phenomenal consciousness, then its primary intension is the same as its secondary intension. Unlike the case of water, if P&~Q is 1-possible, then it is also 2-possible. But then the physical truths do not metaphysically necessitate the truths about phenomenal consciousness, and materialism is false.
The literature on this argument is massive. So, my discussion will focus on "big picture" lines of objection that I think are promising. First, why think that P&~Q is even ideally conceivable? Here is a line of thought:
"First, physical descriptions of the world characterize the world in terms of structure and dynamics. Second, from truths about structure and dynamics, one can deduce only further truths about structure and dynamics. Third, truths about consciousness are not truths about structure and dynamics." 3 Inconceivability claims like this are not unprecedented. Take, for example, Leibniz's famous mill argument.
"Moreover, we must confess that the perception, and what depends on it, is inexplicable in terms of mechanical reasons, that is, through shapes and motions.
If we imagine that there is a machine whose structure makes it think, sense, and have perceptions, we could conceive it enlarged, keeping the same proportions, so that we could enter into it, as one enters a mill. Assuming that, when inspecting its interior, we will only find parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to explain a perception." 4 We cannot conceive how thought can arise from purely mechanical causes -that is, determined purely by the shape, motion and pushing of bodies. Further, the physical 3 Chalmers (2010), p. 120. world is mechanical. So, thought cannot arise from the physical world. Chalmers' reasoning -as he well knows -is quite similar, basically substituting 'structural and dynamical' for 'mechanical', though limiting his point to phenomenal consciousness rather than all thought.
One could reasonably challenge the claim that P&~Q is ideally conceivable. One way to do this is to be open to the possibility that physical kinds are not merely structural and dynamical in the way Chalmers assumes. And Chalmers himself takes this possibility seriously, accounting for it under the option that he describes as Russellian monism. 5 Perhaps there are physical kinds that have an intrinsic nature, unknowable to us but ideally knowable perhaps (e.g., by God), from which truths about phenomenal consciousness are necessitated. This is one way of denying that P&~Q is ideally conceivable. Perhaps we should even challenge Chalmers' claim that structural and dynamical properties can necessitate only other structural and dynamical properties. But regardless of where our emphasis lies, we should be wary of Chalmers' premise that P&~Q is ideally conceivable. The reasons he offers are not much different than those offered by Leibniz hundreds of years ago. Each points out what he takes to be a general truth about the nature of the physical, and these supposed general truths are quite similar -that it is exclusively mechanical and that it is exclusively structural/dynamical. This might cause some concern when we discover that Leibniz used the same line of reasoning to argue against gravity! 6 The point is not that Chalmers would have a similar problem accounting for gravity. Rather, our conception of the physical can radically change (or simply be deficient), such that what might be inconceivable from one conception of the physical could become conceivable from an improved conception. Even if it is ideally conceivable that mechanical, structural/dynamical, or functional facts obtain without phenomenal consciousness (or gravity, or whatever), it does not follow that phenomenal consciousness is not necessitated by the physical facts. Nor does it follow that this is conceivable with the proper and full understanding of the physical. Like Leibniz, we just might have an impoverished understanding of the physical. This should be a familiar point, but it bears repeating.
But even if P&~Q is ideally conceivable, we can reasonably deny that it is 1-possible.
For the time being let us grant that the primary and secondary intensions of phenomenal consciousness are identical, and that premise 3 is true. The comparison and contrast to water and H2O might be helpful here.
A. We can 1-conceive of water but no H2O.
B. It is 1-possible that there is water but no H2O. C. It is not 2-possible that there is water but no H2O. D. We can 1-conceive of P but ~Q.
E. But it is not 1-possible that P but ~Q.
F. It is not 2-possible that P but ~Q.
Chalmers has written that it would be a bizarre and unprincipled exception if the link from 1-conceivability to 1-possibility were broken in the case of P&~Q, as we do not find such disconnect between conceivability and possibility elsewhere and the exception would appear to be ad hoc. 7 But, to the contrary, such a disconnect should not come as a 7 Chalmers (1996), pp. 137-138. surprise. After all, we could have good empirical grounds for thinking that P metaphysically necessitates Q even without believing that P conceptually entails Q. In the parallel case, we could have good reason for thinking that water metaphysically necessitates H2O (e.g., that water is identical to H2O, on the assumption that such an identity must be metaphysically necessary) on largely empirical grounds -combined with a priori principles of good (scientific) reasoning -and without knowledge of (or optimism for) any conceptual entailment. We then work backwards -in this special case in which the primary and secondary intensions are assumed to be identical -to derive a claim about what is either 1-possible or ideally conceivable. In this case, we accept E because we accept F and deny an appearance/reality distinction.
If we begin with a conviction that P&~Q is not 2-possible and we assume that the primary and secondary intensions of Q are identical, then we ought to conclude that either P&~Q is not 1-possible or that P&~Q is not ideally conceivable. We just considered the possibility that P&~Q is ideally conceivable but not 1-possible. The important point here is that if this is the case we have an explanation of the failure of conceivability to track possibility. If we begin with a conviction that P&~Q is not 2-possible, then the lack of an appearance/reality distinction explains why it is not 1-possible either. And when investigating contingent kinds that seem like appropriate objects of scientific investigation, why not put greater stock in our empirically grounded speculations (e.g., that P&~Q is not 2-possible) than we do in our ability to track possibility with conceivability (or, for that matter, in claims about what is ideally conceivable)? We can ask which is more unlikely, that this is not a metaphysical necessity or that here conceivability fails to track possibility? We know that exceptions to the conceivability-possibility thesis would be unexpected in general. But if this is the particular exception, then there is an explanation as to why it is not 1-possible. Of course, we might still wonder why P&~Q is ideally conceivable. For this reason, I prefer going a different route.
Rather than arguing that phenomenal consciousness is a principled exception to conceivability tracking possibility, we could argue that the sameness of primary and secondary intensions explains the ideal inconceivability of P&~Q. This is an appealing alternative, as it preserves the connection between ideal conceivability and 1-possibility.
As before, we start with our conviction that P&~Q is not 2-possible. Given the sameness of primary and secondary intensions, we conclude that it is not 1-possible either. But we still have a firm belief that ideal conceivability tracks 1-possibility. We then deny D and conclude that P&~Q must not be ideally conceivable after all. This is not such a bad conclusion, as ideal conceivability is something of an epistemic pipedream anyway -e.g., Goldbach's conjecture, for all I know, could be ideally conceivable or ideally inconceivable. And here we at least have some justification for the claim that P&~Q is not ideally conceivable -the question is whether or not it outweighs Chalmers' reasons for thinking that P&~Q is ideally conceivable. Again, his reasons are that that the physical is structural and dynamical, and upon ideal reflection we would discover that there is nothing in the structural and dynamical that necessitates phenomenal consciousness. But we could have better reasons for thinking that P metaphysically necessitates Q than we do for accepting Chalmers' limited conception of the physical. Recall that Leibniz also argued against physicalist accounts of mentality -and gravity -along similar lines.
Of course, someone like Chalmers would challenge the claim that we can justifiably have this antecedent confidence in the 2-impossibilty of P&~Q. This is the critical claim.
He would push the line that at most we could be justified in holding that P nomologically necessitates Q, with the conceivability of P&~Q undermining its claim to metaphysical necessity. But philosophers claim various metaphysical necessities, with confidence and apparent justification, without first considering any conceivability claim. This prior commitment to metaphysical necessity then undermines the 2-possibility of apparent counterexamples grounded in conceivability claims. We believe that it is metaphysically necessary that water is H2O or, say, that material objects have their actual origins. The grounds for accepting these metaphysical necessities can be empirical or theoretical, but they are not held on conceivability grounds. We can conceive of situations that seem like counter-examples -very close counterparts to water or people, say, that differ in their chemical constitution or biological origins. Rather than seeing these as disproving the claim to metaphysical necessity, however, we hold that they are not really possible (i.e., 2-possible) after all because, and here is the important point, we have a prior commitment to the metaphysical necessity.
So can there be good grounds for having a prior commitment to the belief that P metaphysically necessitates Q? I see at least 3 possible grounds. First, we should note that the relationship between P and Q does not appear to be like the causal connections that are prime examples of nomological necessities. Rather it appears to be a case of a synchronic necessitation relation like realization, much like we say that watery stuff can be realized in the various chemical constitutions that metaphysically necessitate them.
Second, realization is very plausibly a relation of metaphysical necessity. Given the possibility that phenomenal consciousness is multiply realizable in the physical, we might not want to identify Q with P (and so ground the metaphysical necessity in a claim about identities between rigid designators). But nor would we have identified water with H2O if in our world various chemical kinds (H2O, XYZ, etc.) realized watery stuff. Still, even before we understood the chemical explanations as to how XYZ (say) give rise to watery stuff, we would have reason to think that those various chemical kinds each metaphysically necessitated water -that is how realization is typically understood. And now think of the various physical realizers of phenomenal consciousness as analogues to H2O, XYZ, etc. in our imagined world with chemically heterogeneous water. Third, the simple fact that the physical sciences have had widespread success at eventually providing similar metaphysical necessities for a host of other contingent kinds -many of which were mysteriously realized, at one time -gives some reason to think that the physical-mental correlation is best explained as a metaphysical necessity. Here, one could also make the case that theorizing should be guided by Occam's Razor and a tendency to favor metaphysically necessary connections (even if not yet well understood) over arbitrary nomological connections. The simpler explanation, in this case, being that phenomenal consciousness occurred because it had to occur, just as the simpler explanation in the case of heterogeneously realized water is that XYZ produces water
(even if we do not yet know how) because it has to.
Chalmers considers responses somewhat like this, but he classifies them as inexplicable metaphysical necessities accepted on empirical grounds although epistemically primitive. "Here, a type-B materialist can suggest that P⊃Q may be a Kripkean a posteriori necessity, like 'water is H2O' (though Kripke himself denies this claim). If so, then we would expect there to be an epistemic gap since there is no a priori entailment from P to Q, but at the same time there will be no ontological gap. In this way, Kripke's work can seem to be just what the type-B materialist needs.
…One can argue that in other domains, necessities are not epistemically primitive.
The necessary connection between water and H2O may be a posteriori, but it can itself be deduced from a complete physical description of the world (one can deduce that water is identical to H2O, from which it follows that water is necessarily H2O). The same applies to the other necessities that Kripke discusses.
By contrast, the type-B materialist must hold that the connection between physical states and consciousness is epistemically primitive in that it cannot be deduced from the complete physical truth…" 8 Chalmers is correct that the type-B materialist, by definition, must say that phenomenal consciousness is epistemically primitive in this sense. And this was my earlier response which said that our commitment to the metaphysical necessity could be taken to provide us with a reason to deny that ideal conceivability tracks 1-possibility. But the objector who begins with a conviction in P⊃Q as a metaphysical necessity need not hold this.
Rather, such an objector can take the metaphysical necessity as a reason to believe that P⊃Q is not epistemically primitive -e.g., that P&~Q is not ideally conceivable. And that is the objection I have just offered.
There are two features of phenomenal consciousness that both make it peculiar and which are exploited in conceivability arguments. First, we have no real understanding of how it does or even can arise from the physical. Chalmers is right to attend to this epistemic gap -it truly is a deep scientific mystery. (He has also done a lot to encourage empirical investigation to bridge this gap, serving as a central figure in promoting a science of consciousness. And his is a naturalistic dualism.) Second, there does not appear to be an appearance/reality distinction for phenomenal consciousness. According to Chalmers, the first point supports the ideal conceivability of P&~Q and the second explains why it is metaphysically possible. But if we start with our reasons for accepting P⊃Q as a metaphysical necessity, the second point provides us with a reason for denying that our ignorance provides us with good grounds for accepting the ideal conceivability claim. There is no good reason to accept our admittedly impoverished imagination and conception of the physical as a basis for dualism, over instead accepting our empirically informed claim, grounded in the 3 reasons just presented, to the metaphysical necessities.
It is immodest to favor the a priori so.
3.
Next let's consider exclusion arguments. A common version of these arguments aims to establish a conclusion quite the opposite of zombie arguments -namely, that psychological kinds are identical to physical kinds. These arguments do not focus on phenomenal consciousness, however. Instead, they attend to those psychological kinds that we are even more confident are causally efficacious -e.g., propositional attitudes like belief and desire. Such exclusion arguments have this form: What are the grounds for accepting P3? They are not empirical, and I am unaware of any concern about overdetermination arising from within the sciences. Though different sciences sometimes compete against each other in their quest to solve a problem or explain some phenomenon -causally, in each case -they tend to think that their way of tackling the issue is more likely to succeed than is the other, not that they (e.g., neuroscience and psychology) would exclude one another.
Nor does the concept of causation forbid overdetermination. In fact, accounts of causation have gone out of their way to accommodate it. Here think of the Lewisian epicycles devoted to preserving a counterfactual account in light of causal overdetermination. And there is nothing that would justify prohibiting (or cautioning against) distinct causal laws connecting different types of causes to the same effect, either. Nor is there any obstacle to allowing primitive causal connections between distinct causes and a common effect. There seems to be nothing about the particular accounts of causation in play, or the concept of causation more generally, that would justify treating causation as a zero sum game. To the contrary, comparisons to kindred concepts like reason and responsibility suggest that we should expect effects to often be overdetermined. Just as there can be multiple reasons for an outcome or fact, and just as multiple parties can be responsible for an outcome, there can be multiple causes for an effect. 12 There are situations, however, in which positing overdetermining causes is unprincipled, if not too coincidental to even tolerate. For example, it is unprincipled to say that whenever a virus is present so too is a demon, so both viruses and demons cause some illnesses. And it would be too coincidental if every fire were started by overdetermining causes analogous to the haystack that is struck by lightning and simultaneously lit by a carelessly tossed cigarette. At least some kinds of overdetermination are problematic and unlikely, and this observation can ground legitimate objections to some accounts of the mental. Assuming the causal completeness of physics, isn't it unprincipled -e.g., a violation of Occam's razor -to posit a mental cause (demons!) of this brain activity in addition to the physical cause? Wouldn't it be a massive coincidence if every action of mine had a physical cause and a completely distinct mental cause (lightning and cigarettes!)? This is a decent objection to at least some versions of dualism -i.e., those that deny even nomological connections between the physical and mental. For it would be coincidental, or call out for some kind of coordination like a pre-established harmony, if physical and mental causes were not connected in any way -neither nomologically nor metaphysically -yet they systematically generated the same effects (e.g., action).
But Kim primarily uses his exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalists, those who think that everything is physical although accepting that psychological kinds do not reduce to physical kinds. The worries about overdetermination that were plausible when raised against dualists -that positing such causes is unprincipled and coincidentaldo not transfer over to the non-reductive physicalist, however. According to her, the physical metaphysically necessitates the mental. Metaphysical necessity is as good a reason as any to posit something, and the necessitation also explains why the mental and physical causes co-occur -they had to. Naturalistic dualists like Chalmers can give a similar response.
For this reason we should distinguish between different types of causal overdetermination, some of which pose more of a problem, if systematic, than others. In my (2002) I distinguished varieties according to whether supposedly distinct causes differed in their mechanism (e.g., spatio-temporal pathway) or merely in their properties while sharing a mechanism. The former present us with independent overdetermination, as in the haystack example. The lightning and cigarette work through distinct mechanisms and distinct spatial regions. Given the independence of the mechanismswith no law-like connections between them -systematic independent overdetermination would be coincidental (or coordinated by some pre-established harmony). It is simply unlikely. But for the non-reductive physicalist mental causation is not like this. Instead, the mental cause and physical cause share a mechanism or causal pathway and differ only in their properties within this shared mechanism. I termed this type of overdetermination incorporating overdetermination, as the mental cause incorporates the physical cause.
Given the necessitation relations that define physicalism, this co-occurrence is not coincidental.
Karen Bennett (2003 Bennett ( , 2008 offers a similar treatment of exclusion principles. Rather than distinguishing between coincidental and non-coincidental overdetermination by attending to the mechanism/property distinction, she distinguishes what she considers to be genuine overdetermination from mere multiple causation by a counterfactual test. and physical causal co-occurrence to be unproblematic. This is the real explanation. The contrived counterfactual test is correct to the extent that it indicates this more fundamental explanation. It is not because the non-reductive physicalist's mental and physical causes fail O1 or O2 that they are not bad overdeterminers.
We should now wonder just what is supposed to be problematic about mental causation such that it is threatened to be excluded. There is no reason to think that causal "work" can only be done once, and there is nothing coincidental about the co-occurrence of mental and physical causes. When overdetermination is worrisome, it is because it is coincidental. Now there is one last charge along these lines that could be made. One could think that while individual, co-occurring mental and physical causes can be explained by relations of metaphysical necessity, the presence of higher level kinds, patterns, and the like in the first place is itself a great mystery that calls out for explanation. That is, given physics one might think that it is coincidental that there is chemistry, biology, psychology, or any other special science at all. 14 But if this is a problem, it is not one that should be grounded in a priori speculations. In fact, there is an empirical science -complex systems theory -that, among other things, seeks to explain why we should expect such patterns. But I am unaware of anyone seeking these explanations out of a concern for the autonomy of those higher level sciences. It is immodest to conclude on a priori grounds that incorporating overdetermination is problematic.
4.
I have provided reasons to reject the critical a priori premises of the two recent, dominant arguments on the mind-body problem. But I want to engender a more general sense of the inappropriateness of a priori methods for contingent, natural kinds. This is not to say that philosophers shouldn't venture into empirical territory. We can clear up conceptual or foundational confusions and even offer up empirical hypotheses on largely a priori, brainstorming grounds. But we ought not argue for substantive empirical theses -e.g., identity or distinctness claims, as opposed to proposing possibilities to exploreconcerning contingent kinds within the domain of the sciences on a priori grounds. The objection here is to a method, not a profession. Philosophers can still enter into empirical disputes, and they ought to.
To be sure, a priori speculation has something to contribute to the investigation of scientific kinds. But let's be more modest here -it never settles the issue. 15 Off the top of my head, purely a priori, I offer the following roles for a priori reasoning (supplemented with common sense or armchair observations) when it comes to the mind-body problem.
These roles also extend to the philosophical investigation of other scientific kinds.
Undoubtedly, it has more to contribute than this:
1. Conceptual Investigations and Phenomenology I have already cast my lot with an empirical investigation of mental kinds, so I do not favor an a priori analysis of psychological kinds in the spirit of behaviorism or analytic functionalism. Psychological essences are ultimately to be discovered empirically. Still, some conceptual investigation could delineate the limits of the concepts and corresponding kinds. Phenomenological approaches to consciousness could contribute here as well.
Derive the Limits and Consequences of Views
Philosophers typically are good at drawing out the a priori consequences and limits of a view, both logically and creatively. For example, think of Searle's Chinese Room as a creative, a priori thought experiment constructed to draw out the limits of functional analysis. Leibniz, Searle, and Chalmers each attempts to illustrate the limits of mechanism, functional relations, and structure/dynamics, respectively, through creative thought experiments. In addition to proving their a priori point, however, they also need an empirical premise -e.g., that the physical world is simply mechanical (Leibniz) or structural/dynamical (Chalmers).
Hypothesis Formation
While we cannot confirm a mind-body position on purely a priori grounds, we can certainly generate possible positions a priori. This is especially true for fundamental issues -think of Fodor's LOT and modularity thesis.
Reference and Identity
The mind-body problem presents us with but one example of natural kinds for which identity or realization relations likely hold. Philosophers have something to say about the semantics of natural kind terms and the logic underlying identity statements between them. Philosophers can help reveal that some natural kind term is logically second-order or that it refers to something with a mindindependent essence, to give just two examples. If the terms function as rigid designators, we conclude that the identities are metaphysically necessary.
Kinds
Philosophers contribute not only to our understanding of kind-terms but also to the metaphysical structure of kinds themselves. Here I do not mean a substantive thesis about the nature of some particular kind -e.g., pain. Rather, we can offer a priori or metaphysical theories as to the structure of kinds in general. Here I imagine positions on what it is to be a kind in the first place (and when to posit one), as well as how kinds are to be individuated. This bears on the question whether we should even accept mental kinds in the first place, and a method of individuation would obviously help resolve practical questions of identification.
Theoretical Reduction
We would like to have a procedure to determine when the postulates and generalizations of one theory can be identified with or explained by another theory. This is the topic of theoretical reduction. While it is good to have models that accord with actual scientific practice, theories of reduction are still largely a priori. They can then be used to settle questions concerning inter-theoretic relations.
Metaphysical Relations
Answers to the mind-body problem depend on the relations that are taken to hold between the mental and the physical. We then need theories of relations such as realization, supervenience, nomological necessity, and the like. This is a largely a priori enterprise.
Basically, I am advocating a return to an old fashioned dichotomy for the roles of the a priori and posteriori when it comes to theorizing about contingent kinds that, prima facie, fall within the sciences. The a priori is largely formal (or speculative), and it cannot ground substantive claims about contingent reality. It needs a posteriori input. (And I would say the converse for overly empirical treatments of the mind body problem -they need a priori input.) The cottage industry that the zombie and exclusion arguments have generated has been hugely beneficial, by and large, for its philosophical spin-offs -e.g., 2-dimensional semantics, modal rationalism, the nature of the physical, the nature of causation, the causal relata, the status of the special sciences. But we should be more than wary of the arguments themselves. Specifically, empirically based reasons for positing metaphysical necessities should trump our thoughts about what remote physical outcomes
